Synthesizing and Optimizing FDIR Recovery Strategies From Fault Trees by Mikaelyan, Liana et al.
Synthesizing and Optimizing FDIR Recovery
Strategies From Fault Trees
Liana Mikaelyan1[0000−0002−2788−3777], Sascha Mu¨ller1[0000−0002−1913−1719],
Andreas Gerndt1[0000−0002−0409−8573], and Thomas Noll2[0000−0002−1865−1798]
1 Software for Space Systems and Interactive Visualization,
DLR (German Aerospace Center), 38108 Braunschweig, Germany
{Liana.Mikaelyan, Sa.Mueller, Andreas.Gerndt}@dlr.de
2 Software Modeling and Verification Group,
RWTH Aachen University, 52056 Aachen, Germany
Noll@cs.rwth-aachen.de
Abstract. Redundancy concepts are an integral part of the design of
space systems. Deciding when to activate which redundancy and which
component should be replaced can be a difficult task. In this paper,
we refine a methodology where recovery strategies are synthesized from
a model of non-deterministic dynamic fault trees. The synthesis is per-
formed by transforming non-deterministic dynamic fault trees into Markov
Automata. From the optimized scheduler, an optimal recovery strategy
can then be derived and represented by a model we call Recovery Au-
tomaton. We discuss techniques on how this Recovery Automaton can be
further optimized to contain fewer states and transitions and show the
effectiveness of our approach on two case studies.
Keywords: FDIR · Fault Tree Analysis · Synthesis · Formal Methods.
1 Introduction
Reliability engineering is an important discipline in the design of any safety
critical system, in particular in the domain of aerospace systems and spacecraft.
No matter how well designed a system is, it still has to deal with the presence
of faults to some extent. Faults in this context can be events such as equipment
failure, wrong sensor readings, external interferences and many more. To raise
trust in handling system failures, reliability engineering tries to embed Failure
Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) concepts. These concepts are derived
using various tools and methodologies such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [9].
FTA is a methodology commonly used in the industry for performing state-
of-the-art failure analysis [13]. The resulting Fault Trees (FT) describe how
faults propagate through components and subsystems of a system and eventu-
ally lead to a top-level system failure. Graphical representations of these trees
are intuitive and easy to understand. On the one hand, FTs can be used to
analyze the system qualitatively in terms of fault combinations that lead to
system failure. On the other hand, they also enable quantitative analysis of
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important computable measures such as reliability. Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT)
are an extension introducing temporal dependencies and new features to analyze
redundancy concepts known as spare management. However, there are challenges
arising from non-deterministic behavior of DFTs such as spare races. An example
for such race behavior can be seen in a system of two operative memories together
with a pool of two spare memories. If both operative memories fail at the same
time it is unclear which backup memory takes over the role of which operational
one.
To overcome this shortcoming, a new methodology was presented in [11]. It
introduces a model of Non-deterministic Dynamic Fault Trees (NdDFT) as an
extension to DFTs. In contrast to the latter, the new NdDFT does not impose
a fixed, rigid order on the spares to be used. As next step, the methodology
foresees transforming this NdDFT model into a Markov Automaton (MA) which
is suitable for the computation of the aforementioned non-deterministic decisions
on spare activations. By optimizing the scheduling of the MA model in terms of
reliability of the system, a recovery strategy for the NdDFT can be synthesized.
This recovery strategy defines which spare has to be used in which failure state
of the system and can therefore guarantee an optimal reliability at all times.
The goal of the present paper is to refine the methodology presented in [11]
by further developing an automata model that formalizes the decision process
underlying a recovery strategy, a so-called Recovery Automaton (RA). We give
its formal definition and show how it can be minimized in order to obtain an
efficient implementation of recovery strategies for FDIR.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 of this paper summarizes the
related work relevant to the topic of FTs, MA and synthesis of recovery strategies.
Further background on the theory of FTs including their (non-deterministic)
dynamic variants is given in Section 3. Section 4 describes the process of synthe-
sizing recovery strategies from a given NdDFT as well as a model to represent
such strategies, which is further optimized in Section 5. Section 6 then evaluates
the technique on a use case example. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 7
and provides some outlook to future work.
2 Related Work
The goal of FDIR lies in keeping a system in a stable and operational state, even
in the presence of faults. While some of the following steps may be omitted in
some cases, performing FDIR generally means applying the following procedural
approach [15]:
– Monitor the system to detect the occurrence of faults.
– Identify the fault and localize it within the system.
– Isolate the fault and prevent further propagation into other parts of the
system.
– Perform recovery actions to reconfigure the system and return it into a stable
state.
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In order to derive how faults relate to each other and eventually lead to a
system wide failure, failure analysis techniques such as FTA can be employed.
One of the very basic types of FTs are Static Fault Trees (SFT). They employ
Boolean algebra to combine various different failure events by AND and OR
operations, often graphically represented as gates, until they sum up to the overall
system failure. The failure events are usually related to faulty components of
the system. Applying this methodology, statements such as “The system fails if
component A and component B fail” can be modeled and refined to arbitrary
levels of precision. The probability of the top-level failure after time t (reliability)
can be computed from a given DFT for example by transforming a DFT into a
Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) [5].
Markov Automata [6] are an extension to CTMCs. They are state-based
transition systems with two types of transitions: They can contain continuous-time
transitions (also called Markovian transitions) that are labeled with rates, that
is, non-negative real values as well as immediate, non-deterministic transitions
labeled by actions. In the latter case, transitions have to be chosen by a so-called
scheduler. The computation of optimal schedulers for Markov Automata with
respect to various quantitative objectives, such as state reachability, is discussed
in [7].
Computing strategies for recovery purposes from a given fault model has been
researched in other contexts. In [1], a similar approach is taken for repairable
fault trees. The authors consider non-deterministic repair policies where the
repair order is not fixed. Optimal repair policies are then computed by converting
the repairable fault tree to a Markov decision process, a time-discrete version of
Markov Automata. However, the authors do not consider DFT models. In [4],
Dynamic Decision Networks (DDN) are employed and their inference capabilities
are exploited to create autonomous on-board FDIR systems for spacecraft that
can select reactive and preventive recovery actions during run-time. In [12], the
authors propose creating the DDN from an extension of the DFT model. Timed
Failure Propagation Graphs are used in [2] to synthesize FDIR components,
namely monitors for the purpose of fault detection and recovery plans for every
specified combination of fault and mode. Here, the recovery components are
created using a planning based approach on predefined actions.
3 Fault Trees
FTs are graphs consisting of two types of nodes respectively representing events
and gates. The root node, or top level event (TLE), usually represents the event
of a system failure whereas the leaves of the tree model the event of individual
components failing. The leaves are also called basic events (BE). They correspond
to a Boolean variable where false represents the initial state of no failure. The
variable is considered true in case of a failure event. We consider here only
the case of permanent failure, i.e. once a BE has failed, it remains in a failed
state for all future points in time. The branches of the trees are represented by
the gates performing operations on the events. FTs are directed acyclic graphs
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(a) BE
Non-Basic
Fault
(b) Non-basic event (c) OR (d) AND
k
(e) k-VOTE
Fig. 1. Gates and events in a Static Fault Tree
starting from the BEs pointing over the gates towards the system failure event.
In the following, basic events will be denoted by b1, b2, . . ., sets of basic events by
B1, B2, . . . and failure rates by λ1, λ2, . . ..
3.1 Static Fault Trees
Fig. 1 shows the gates and events used in the SFT notation. SFTs use Boolean
operations represented by AND and OR gates. There also exist other gates such
as the k-VOTE gate, which propagates if at least k inputs have failed. Observe
that a 1-VOTE gate corresponds to an OR gate and a k-VOTE gate with k inputs
to an AND gate. Implementation wise, all gates can therefore be considered as
k-VOTE gates for some appropriate k. Some other extensions also introduce a
NOT gate. However, this allows the construction of fault trees where the TLE
can change from having failed to working again as new failures occur. These fault
trees are known as non-coherent fault trees and have been dismissed as being a
sign for modeling errors [14].
3.2 Dynamic Fault Trees
Many extensions have been proposed to the formalism of FTs [13] to increase
its expressiveness and enhance its features. A particular extension is the notion
of Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT). It introduces temporal understanding and new
features to analyze redundancy concepts known as spare management. In DFTs,
a node can be either failed, active (operational) or dormant (operational). A node
that is an unactivated spare is dormant. All other nodes are activated. Together
with this state, failure rates for failing actively and failing dormantly can be
defined for every BE.
Fig. 2 depicts the notation to extend SFTs to DFTs introducing new gates
POR, PAND, SPARE and FDEP. The PAND (priority AND) gate propagates in
case all inputs fail exactly in sequence from left to right. The POR (priority OR)
gate propagates in case the leftmost input occurs before all other inputs.
(a) POR (b) PAND (c) SPARE (d) FDEP
Fig. 2. Standard dynamic gates
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The SPARE gate is connected to a primary event and a set of spare events. It
propagates a failure if the primary input failed and all spares are either claimed
or failed themselves. The spare events can be shared with another SPARE gate,
therefore a spare can be claimed by either the one or the other SPARE gate. But
there may be no shared elements between the primary input and any spare. The
order in which such a spare is chosen is deterministic and defined at design time
by the reliability engineer.
The FDEP (functional dependency) has a trigger event on the left hand side
and any number of dependent events functionally dependent on the triggering
event. When the trigger event occurs, the dependent events are set to fail as well.
The output of an FDEP gate only indicates to which tree it belongs and has no
further semantical meaning.
In the following, we give an example to illustrate the DFT notation. Fig. 3
shows a system consisting of two memory components which are covered by two
spare memories for failures. The two spares are shared among the two SPARE
gates. According to DFT semantics, Memory3 will be used before Memory4 in
case of a failure of Memory1 or Memory2. In addition, the system has two hot
redundant, always active power sources, Power1 and Power2. Both primaries
Memory1 and Memory2 are powered by Power1 and the redundancies Memory3
and Memory4 are powered by the second power source Power2. Using FDEPs,
the failure of a power source is propagated to the respective memory components.
In the figure, FDEP dependent events are marked by an arrow and dashed lines
indicate the parent of an FDEP.
System
SPARE2
Memory2
SPARE1
Memory1
b1 b2
Memory3
b3
Memory4
b4
Power1
b5
FDEP1
Power2
b6
FDEP2
Fig. 3. Example DFT
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3.3 Non-Deterministic Dynamic Fault Trees
As described before, DFTs require spares to be activated in a fixed and rigid order.
This order cannot be adapted depending on faults that have previously occurred.
Additionally, in cases of spare races it is not semantically clear which SPARE
gate claims the actual redundancy. To relax on this semantical restriction of the
DFT model, [11] introduces an inherently non-deterministic DFT model (NdDFT,
following the naming in [1]). The syntax and notation of the NdDFT is completely
adopted from the DFT. Semantically, the NdDFT drops the requirement that
spares are always activated from left to right. Morover, the new non-deterministic
semantics allows for a SPARE gate to leave the spares available for more important
SPARE gates by not claiming. Whenever BEs occur in an NdDFT, the new
semantics allow to perform valid recovery actions of the following form:
Definition 1 (Recovery Action). A recovery action r in an NdDFT T is an
action of the form
– [] (empty action) or
– CLAIM (G,S) (spare gate G claims spare S, where S is a spare of G).
We denote the set of all recovery actions possible in an NdDFT T by R(T )
and the set of recovery action sequences by RS (T ) := (R(T ) \ {[]})∗. Similarly
we denote the set of all non-empty subsets of basic events by BES (T ).
4 Synthesizing Recovery Strategies
Here we describe the essential steps; details can be found in [11]. First, the
NdDFT model is transformed into a Markov Automaton (MA) that represents
all possible (non-deterministic) decisions on spare activations. By optimizing
the scheduling of the MA model in terms of reliability of the system, a recovery
strategy for the NdDFT can be synthesized. This strategy is represented by a
Recovery Automaton (RA) that defines which spare has to be used in which
failure state of the system and can therefore guarantee an optimal reliability at
all times. The latter can be computed by a quantitative analysis of the Markov
Chain that is obtained from the RA, enriched by the failure rates of basic events
as determined by the original NdDFT. Fig. 4 visualizes the procedure.
NdDFT Markov Automaton Recovery Automaton
Markov Chain Reliability Measures
Fig. 4. Transformation road map
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4.1 Recovery Strategies and Automata
In the NdDFT, the actual recovery action r that is applied is defined by a given
recovery strategy. In the following, transitions of Recovery Automata are labeled
by recovery action sequences. Given the observed basic events, a recovery strategy
is then a mapping that returns the recovery action sequence that should be taken
accordingly. The NdDFT considers recovery strategies that only have recovery
actions as given in Def. 1. They are defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Recovery Strategy). A recovery strategy for an NdDFT T is
a mapping Recovery : BES (T )∗ → RS (T )∗ such that
– Recovery(ε) = ε and
– Recovery(B1, . . . , Bn) = Recovery(B1, . . . , Bn−1), rsn with rsn ∈ RS (T ).
As each basic event can occur at most once, the recovery strategy only needs
to be defined for pairwise disjoint sets of basic events, i.e., Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for i 6= j.
A finite automaton that represents a recovery strategy will be called Recovery
Automaton.
Definition 3 (Recovery Automaton). A Recovery Automaton (RA) RT =
(Q, δ, q0) of an NdDFT T is an automaton where
– Q is a finite set of states,
– q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, and
– δ : Q × BES (T ) → Q × RS (T ) is a deterministic transition function that
maps the current state and an observed set of faults to the successor state
and a recovery action sequence.
The recovery strategy induced by a Recovery Automaton R is denoted by
RecoveryR. An example of a Recovery Automaton for a simple Fault Tree
consisting of a SPARE gate with a cold redundant spare is given in Fig. 5.
SPARE
RedundancyPrimary
b1 b2
(a) NdDFT
q0start q1
{b1} : CLAIM (SPARE,Redundancy)
(b) Recovery Automaton
Fig. 5. Example of (a) NdDFT and (b) RA
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4.2 Non-Deterministic Dynamic Fault Trees to Markov Automata
Transforming an NdDFT to a Markov Automaton can be done by adapting
traditional algorithms for transforming DFTs to CTMCs. As base algorithm, we
use the one given in [5]. The adapted algorithm operates by memorizing two
sets of data in every of its states: First, the history of occurred basic event sets
(B1, B2, . . . , Bn). Second, a mapping from spare gates to the currently claimed
spare. The initial, empty history of the algorithm is denoted by (). Starting with
this initial state, all active basic events, i.e. those that are not associated to an
unactivated spare, are used to compute Markovian successors for each of them
while extending the history accordingly.
The respective basic event set is obtained by taking the active basic event and
computing all basic events that transitively fail due to FDEPs. The transitions are
labeled with the respective failure rate of the basic event causing the transition.
All transitions that would lead to a state that implies that the top-level event
(system failure) has occurred, are connected to a special FAIL state instead. For
each target state of a Markovian transition, the algorithm generates successors
using non-deterministic transitions. Each non-deterministic transition is labeled
by a valid recovery action.
4.3 Synthesizing Recovery Automata from Markov Automata
Using existing techniques for optimizing the scheduling of a Markov Automaton,
the optimal non-deterministic transitions for maximizing the system reliability
can be computed. The Recovery Automaton model is then used to represent the
underlying decision process of the scheduler.
Extracting a Recovery Automaton from a scheduler for a Markov Automaton
is achieved by replacing sequences of transitions for states s0, s1, . . . , sn of the form
(s0, B : λ, s1), (s1, r1, s2), . . . , (sn−1, rn, sn), where B is a basic event set, λ a fail-
ure rate and r1, . . . , rn recovery actions, by the transition δ(s0, B) = (sn, r1 . . . rn)
where empty recovery actions are ignored. This applies to all transitions where
s1, . . . , sn are the successors computed by the optimized schedule of the Markov
Automaton. All other non-deterministic transitions are then discarded. Finally,
the algorithm discards all unreachable states.
5 Further Optimization of Recovery Automata
Complex systems usually exhibit a large number of faults that may occur. This
means that NdDFTs describing such systems may be very large and correspond-
ingly synthesized Recovery Automata may contain redundant states. In this
section, we refine the given synthesis procedure by discussing some techniques
for reducing the state space and the transition count of a synthesized Recovery
Automaton. This leads to the task of finding an automaton with the same “be-
havior” that contains a smaller number of states. To capture this notion of having
the same behavior, we introduce the concept of recovery equivalence between
Recovery Automata as follows:
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Definition 4 (RA Recovery Equivalence). Let R1 = (Q1, δ1, q01) and R2 =
(Q2, δ2, q02) be two RAs. We define a binary relation ≈R such that it holds true
for any two RA that R1 ≈R R2 iff for any sequence of sets of basic events
B1, . . . , Bn with Bi ∩Bj = ∅ for any i 6= j it holds that:
RecoveryR1(B1, . . . , Bn) = RecoveryR2(B1, . . . , Bn)
Given a Recovery Automaton as an input, the task of minimization involves
obtaining an equivalent recovery automaton with as few states as possible. The
standard problem of automata minimization is well-known and has been studied
extensively. In this work, we apply the usual definition of trace equivalence and
lift it to states of Recovery Automata:
Definition 5 (Trace Equivalence). Let RT = (Q, δ, q0) be an RA. A trace
equivalence ≈ ⊆ Q×Q is a maximal, binary relation such that it holds for any
states q1, q2 ∈ Q that q1 ≈ q2 iff for any B ∈ BES (T ) it holds that:
δ(q1, B) = (q
′
1, rs1) and δ(q2, B) = (q
′
2, rs2) with q
′
1 ≈ q′2 and rs1 = rs2
Equivalent states in automata can be computed using the Partition Refinement
algorithm [8] and then a minimized automaton can be obtained by merging all
equivalent states. In the setting of Recovery Automata, we can go even further
and merge pairs of states that are not trace equivalent as long as the behavior
of the automaton does not change. A simple example for a case where merging
non-equivalent states yields a Recovery Automaton that induces an equivalent
recovery strategy, can be seen in Fig. 6.
In the following we present the main contribution of this work: Rules that
allow to merge states that are not trace-equivalent, yet yield implementations
of equivalent recovery strategies. We identified two cases where merging non-
equivalent states does not change the induced recovery strategy.
– Case 1: Merging Orthogonal States.
– Case 2: Merging the FAIL state to Predecessors.
In both cases, the key to minimization that we exploit, is the fact that the
inputs of the automaton are produced by an FT. Hence, basic events can only
occur at most once. This leads to the effect that certain traces in the RA are
not valid inputs for the correspondingly induced recovery strategy. Therefore it
gives us additional freedom for merging states that do would not be allowed to
be merged in a standard automaton model.
q0start q1
B : r
B : 
q0start
B : r
Fig. 6. (a) initial RA; (b) minimized RA
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q1
q2
B2 : x2
B1 : x1
B1 : y1
B2 : y2
B2 : y2
B1 : y1
q12
B2 : x2
B1 : x1
B2 : y2
B1 : y1
Fig. 7. (a) initial RA; (b) RA after merging states q1 and q2
5.1 Merging Orthogonal States
In the first rule, the idea is to identify states that may have transitions with
disagreeing outputs, but where we can guarantee for certain that those transitions
can never be taken, as their necessary inputs can no longer be produced. As
mentioned before, the key to this idea lies in the exploitation of the property that
basic events can only occur at most once in an FT. This gives us the following
observation: If a basic event occurs on every path leading to a state in an RA,
then it is guaranteed that in the future no transition listing this basic event in its
guards can be taken. Note that Recovery Automata are deterministic automata,
meaning that unlike non-deterministic automata they always have a transition
defined for every possible input. Fig. 7 abstractly illustrates the application of
this merging rule.
For the purpose of formalizing the intuitively given notion, we now introduce
the concept of orthogonal states. To capture the basic event sets that can no
longer be produced by an FT upon having reached a state in the RA, we define
the set of guaranteed inputs of a state q as a function GI : Q→ Q with:
GI (q) := {B ∈ BES (T ) | for all paths q0B0 : rs0 . . . qn−1Bn−1 : rsn−1q
∃i : Bi ∩B 6= ∅}
In order to compute the set of guaranteed inputs, we apply the work list algorithm
[10] using the following transfer functions:
GI (q0) := ∅
GI (q) :=
⋂
(p,B)∈pred(q)
GI (p) ∪ {B}
With pred(q) := {(p,B) | δ(p,B) = (q, rs) for some rs, p 6= q} denoting the set
of predecessor transitions of a state q. Having setup these preliminary definitions,
the concept of orthogonality between states can now be formalized with the
following definition:
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q0start
q1
q2
q3
B2 : r2
B1 : r1
B2 : 
B1 : r1
B1 : 
B2 : r2
q0start q1 q3
B2 : r2
B1 : r1
B2 : r2
B1 : r1
Fig. 8. (a) initial RA R1; (b) RA R2 after merging states q1 and q2
Definition 6 (Orthogonal States). Let RT = (Q, δ, q0) be an RA. Let further
p, q ∈ Q be two non-initial distinct states and B ∈ BES (T ). Then p, q are
orthogonal with respect to B iff
B ∈ GI (p) ∪GI (q)
To illustrate the definition of orthogonality, we consider as an example the
Recovery Automaton depicted in Fig. 8. The RA we consider there reacts to two
distinct basic event sets B1 and B2 and performs a corresponding recovery action
r1 or r2 accordingly. An NdDFT that would produce such an RA would be for
example a system consisting of two parallel spare gates running independently
from each other, e.g. spare gates with no shared spare. For the guaranteed inputs
we have:
– GI (q0) = ∅,
– GI (q1) = GI (q0) ∪ {B2} = {B2},
– GI (q2) = GI (q0) ∪ {B1} = {B1} and
– GI (q3) = (GI (q1) ∪ {B1}) ∩ (GI (q2) ∪ {B2}) = {B1, B2}.
Thus, by Def. 6 it holds that q1 and q2 are orthogonal with respect to basic
event sets B1 and B2. Observe that q1 has an outgoing loop transition labeled
with B2 :  that cannot occur. Similarly, q2 has an outgoing loop transition
labeled by B1 :  that cannot occur. In the merged RA, these transitions are
eliminated and all the other incoming and outgoing transitions are redirected to
start and end at the merged state respectively.
We are now ready to incorporate the orthogonality concept into an equivalence
definition. We extend the basic trace equivalence definition as follows:
Definition 7 (RA State Recovery Equivalence). Let RT = (Q, δ, q0) be an
RA. A state-based recovery equivalence ≈R ⊆ Q×Q is a maximal relation such
that it holds for any states q1, q2 ∈ Q that q1 ≈R q2 iff for any B ∈ BES (T ) it
holds that either:
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– δ(q1, B) = (q
′
1, rs1) and δ(q2, B) = (q
′
2, rs2) with q
′
1 ≈ q′2 and rs1 = rs2 or
– q1, q2 are orthogonal with respect to B.
We now prove the correctness of our approach. The following theorem states
that merging two recovery equivalent states yields a recovery equivalent RA.
Theorem 1. Let R1 = (Q1, δ1, q01) be an RA with a pair of states q1 and q2
such that q1 ≈R q2. Let further R2 = (Q2, δ2, q02) be an RA that contains equal
states and transitions as R1, apart from merging q1 and q2 into a single state q12,
redirecting the incoming transitions of q1 and q2 to q12 and copying the outgoing
transitions from q1 with guard B /∈ GI (q1) and q2 with guard B /∈ GI (q2). Then
R1 ≈R R2.
Proof. Let β := B1, . . . , Bn ∈ BES (T )∗ be a sequence of basic event sets pro-
duced by an NdDFT. Then Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for any i 6= j. We distinguish two
cases:
– Assume R1 never vists q1 or q2. By definiton of R2 we then have that also
R2 does not visit q12. And by definition of R2 again we thus immediately
have that RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR2(β).
– Assume R1 visits q1 (the case of visiting q2 is analog) upon reading Bi for
some i < n. Now consider Bi+1. Let q
′
1, q
′
12 and rs1, rs12 be such that:
δ1(q1, Bi+1) = (q
′
1, rs1) and
δ2(q12, Bi+1) = (q
′
12, rs12).
By Def. 7 this means that we have either:
• rs1 = rs12 and q′1 ≈ q′12. By correctness of merging trace equivalent states
we hence obtain RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR2(β).
• q1, q2 are orthogonal with respect to Bi+1. Then by Def. 6 it holds that:
Bi+1 ∈ GI (q1) ∪GI(q2)
If Bi+1 ∈ GI (q1) then there exists by construction of GI an index
j < i+ 1 such that Bi+1 ∩Bj 6= ∅. Contradiction to the definition of β.
Therefore we obtain conclude Bi+1 ∈ GI (q2). By construction of R2 this
implies that the transition of q2 is not copied and the transition of q1 is
chosen instead. Thus, rs1 = rs12 and q
′
1 = q
′
12. Hence we can conclude
RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR2(β).
In all cases we have RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR2(β) and thus R1 ≈R R2
by Def. 4.
uunionsq
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q1 q2
B : r
B : 
q1
B : r
Fig. 9. (a) initial RA; (b) RA after merging FAIL states to predecessors
5.2 Merging the FAIL State to Predecessors
The idea of the second case is to identify FAIL states that do not contribute to
new recovery actions sequences when a set of faults occurs. If a state only leads
to a FAIL state, the transition can be turned into a self-loop. And should the
FAIL state no longer be reachable, it can be eliminated. This rule is abstractly
illustrated in Fig. 9. We further introduce the concept of a FAIL state.
Definition 8 (FAIL State). Let RT = (Q, δ, q0) be an RA and q ∈ Q a state.
Then q is a FAIL state iff for any B ∈ BES (T ), all transitions from q are of the
form δ(q,B) = (q, ).
The formalized merging rule can then be captured by the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let R1 = (Q1, δ1, q01) be an RA with a pair of states q1 and q2
such that q2 is a FAIL state and all transitions of q1 are -loops except for one
transition being of the form δ1(q1, B) = (q2, rs), such that rs 6= . Let further
R2 = (Q2, δ2, q02) be an RA with equal states and transitions as R1, except for
turning outgoing transitions of q1 into loop transitions. Then R1 ≈R R2.
Proof. Let β := B1, . . . , Bn ∈ BES(T )∗ be a sequence of basic event sets with
Bi ∩Bj = ∅. We distinguish two cases:
– Assume R1 never visits q1. Then by definition of R2, it also never visits q1.
As both automata are defined to be equal otherwise, we then immediately
have that RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR2(β).
– Assume R1 visits q1 upon reading Bi for some i < n. Then by definition,
R2 also visits q1 upon reading Bi. Now consider Bi+1. By the construction
of R2 it holds that δ1(q1, Bi+1) = (q2, rs) and δ2(q1, Bi+1) = (q1, rs). for
some recovery action sequence rs. Since q2 is a FAIL state we obtain from
Def. 8 that δ1(q2, Bj) = (q2, ) for any j > i + 1. Moreover, since also
Bj ∩Bi+1 = ∅ for any j > i+ 1 we also have by definition of q1 and R2 that
δ2(q1, Bj) = (q1, ). In total, we can therefore conclude that:
RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR1(B1, . . . , Bi, Bi+1)
= RecoveryR2(B1, . . . , Bi, Bi+1)
= RecoveryR2(β)
In all cases RecoveryR1(β) = RecoveryR2(β). Hence, R1 ≈R R2 by Def. 4.uunionsq
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6 Case Studies
In order to evaluate the presented techniques, we apply the synthesis methodology
including the newly described merging rules to further optimize the created RA
models to two use cases.
6.1 Multiprocessor Computing System
Target System. We consider the literature example of a Multiprocessor Com-
puting System (MCS) based on the model given in [3]. The MCS consists of two
main components: The Bus and the Computing Module (CM). The CM is hot
redundant and consists of two further CMs CM1 and CM2. Each of these CMs
requires a disk, a processor and a memory unit. Each CM has a warm redundant
backup disk. Furthermore, a shared redundant memory unit MS is available to
the entire CM in case that their own memory unit fails. Finally, both processors
are powered by a common power source PS. The common power source itself is
again hot redundant and consists of the two power units PS1 and PS2. Fig. 10
shows a NdDFT that describes the MCS.
System
CM
CM2
MEMORY2
M2
PROC2
P2
DISK2
D22D21
CM1
MEMORY1
M1
PROC1
P1
DISK1
D12D11
BUS
PS MS
PS1 PS2
Fig. 10. NdDFT of the Multiprocessor Computing System
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Experimental Results. The described synthesis algorithm was performed to
obtain a Recovery Automaton from the described NdDFT. The RA was then
optimized by merging trace-equivalent and recovery equivalent states and by
eliminating redundant transitions.
Table 1 shows the results after minimizing the synthesized RA. Observe
that initially the RA contained a large number of states and transitions. After
performing the Partition Refinement algorithm based on the trace-equivalence
definition, the number of states and transitions was significantly reduced. After
performing the Partition Refinement and merging non-trace equivalent states
according to the described merging rules, it was observed that the number of states
was further reduced by 95.86% and the number of transitions was further reduced
by 95.05%. Thus, merging non-trace equivalent states additionally reduced the
number of states obtained by merging trace-equivalent states by 38.81% and the
number of transitions was reduced by 32.38%. This indicates the effectiveness of
the proposed approach to consider cases when non-trace equivalent states can be
merged to obtain an equivalent Recovery Automaton having the same behavior.
Table 1. Synthesizing and Minimizing Results.
Equivalence Relation #States #Transitions States Removed Transitions Removed
– 991 7635 – –
Trace Equivalence 67 559 93.24% 92.68%
Recovery Equivalence 41 378 95.86% 95.05%
6.2 Memory System witn N Redundancies
Target System. To assess the the state space reduction for Recovery Automata
in terms of increasing DFT complexity, we consider a family of DFTs based
on the previous memory system use case given in Fig. 3. The model family is
depicted in Fig. 11a. As before, the system consists of two main memory units
Memory1 and Memory2. However, instead of a fixed size of redundant memory
systems, they now share a variable pool of cold redundancies of size N .
Experimental Results. Fig. 11b shows how the state space sizes increase with
varying number of redundancies N for both the raw Markov Automaton of the
NdDFT and the finally resulting minimized RA. Note that the y-axis is scaled
logarithmically. It can be seen that the RA state space grows significantly slower,
but still at an exponential pace. However, it can also be seen that the state
space reduction remains consistent over the course of the increasing number of
redundancies.
16 L. Mikaelyan, S. Mu¨ller, A. Gerndt, T. Noll
System
SPARE2
Memory2
SPARE1
Memory1
b1 b2
Redundancy1
bR,1
RedundancyN
bR,N
. . .
(a) Memory system with N redundancies
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Fig. 11. State space growth of RA for memory system with N redundancies
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we investigated the problem of optimizing Recovery Automata
that represent recovery strategies synthesized from NdDFTs. New algorithms
to minimize an RA by additionally eliminating non trace-equivalent states and
redundant transitions were provided. In particular, we extended the notion of
recovery equivalence between states by introducing the notion of orthogonal
states and a rule for merging them. In addition, we introduced the concept of
fail states and a rule for merging them with predecessor states. A formal proof
showing that an equivalent RA is produced for each case was given. A case study
using the described approach was provided and the evaluated results showed
that it allows to obtain a more efficient implementation of recovery strategies for
FDIR than solely eliminating trace equivalent states.
In the future, we would like to extend the Recovery Automata model to deal
with input of Fault Trees with transient and repairable faults and consider how
the merging rules can be transferred.
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